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what	 enters	 into	 the	 (official)	 record	 of	 philosophy.	 We	 examine	
the	 role	 peer	 review	 had	 in	 two	 important	 episodes	 in	 the	 history	
of	 twentieth-century	 philosophy,	 episodes	 that	 centre	 on	 changing	







such	 as	 Mind, The Philosophical Review, Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and	Philosophy of Science.	We	
point	out	 that	peer	 review	 (in	 journals)	has	been,	 and	continues	 to	
be,	 partisan	 about	 philosophical	 approach	 in	much	 the	 way	 it	 was	
in	Mind under	Moore	and	Ryle.	We	also	note	that	such	partisanship	
should	not,	on	the	official	view	of	the	role	of	peer	review,	be	part	of	
peer	 review.	We	go	on	 to	 consider	whether	we	ought	 to	accept	 the	
verdict	that	peer	review	in	mainstream	philosophy	is	problematic.	Two	
features	 of	 mainstream	 philosophy	 are	 important	 here,	 namely	 the	
absence	of	established-to-be-reliable	ways	of	answering	philosophers’	




















that	 are	 predominantly	 critical.	 These	 include	 classical	 analytic	 phi-





and	 representational	 realism.3	Another	approach	 to	philosophy	 that	
is	important	in	Britain	during	our	period	is	philosophical	psychology.	
This	 approach	 can,	 in	 principle,	 be	 combined	 either	with	 critical	 or	
with	 speculative	 approaches	 to	 philosophy	 and	 centres	 on	 the	 idea	
that	psychological	analysis	can	solve,	or	help	to	solve,	many,	or	all,	of	
the	problems	of	philosophy.4































Broad	 1924;	 Mackenzie	 1930;	 Stedman	 1937).	 Roughly,	 speculative	






to	 new	 knowledge	 at	 all	 and,	 instead,	merely	 aims	 to	 illuminate	 or	
clarify	what	is	already	known.
One	of	 the	main	approaches	 to	philosophy	 in	Britain	during	 the	
first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	is	British	idealism.	It	is,	as	Mander	
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particular,	Philosophy	—	which,	 interestingly	enough,	was	 founded	 in	





can	 journals	 such	as	The Journal of Philosophy, The Personalist	 (which	










and	 its	 implementation.	Moore	thus	 failed	to	continue	the	 impartial	
policy	of	Stout.11
Our	 description	 of	what	Moore	 included	 in	Mind	 fits	with	what	
Lewy	 (1976)	 tells	 us	 about	 this;	 Lewy’s	 description	 is	merely	 under-
stated,	and	substantially	incomplete,	regarding	the	mid-1920s	chang-
es	 in	 the	 journal.	Our	description	does,	however,	 conflict	with	War-
nock’s	(1976)	contribution	to	the	100th-anniversary	special	edition	of	
8.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Mackenzie	 (1930),	 Fawcett	 (1932),	 Jeans	 (1932),	 Kamiat	 (1938),	
Oakeley	(1945)	and	Mure	(1949)	in	Philosophy;	see	also	Hallett	(1931),	Bow-
man	(1932),	Paton	(1935)	and	Stedman	(1937)	in	the	Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society.















Mind	 changes.	Work	 associated	with	new	and	 critical	 realism,	work	
in	the	history	of	philosophy	and,	especially,	work	in	classical	analytic	
philosophy	are	prominent	in	the	journal;	pragmatism	continues	to	be	










In	sum,	around	1924–1925,	editorial	policy	at	Mind appears to have 
changed	so	as	 to	 favour	some	of	 the	approaches	 to	philosophy	 that	
were	 still	 thriving	 in	 Britain	 over	 others	 that	were	 doing	 so.	 For	 in-




















like	Moore,	was	essentially	 solely	 responsible	 for	 reviewing	 submis-
sions	 to	Mind	 and	deciding	on	 their	 fate	 (see	Warnock	 1976).	More-
over,	his	decisions	on	this	matter	reflected	at	least	three	relevant	poli-
cies	 regarding	Mind’s	 contents.	 First,	 Ryle	 substantially	 reduced	 the	
presence	of	 the	history	of	philosophy	 in	Mind	 (Hamlyn	2003),	 thus	
reversing	Moore’s	 policy	 on	 the	matter.	 Second,	 Ryle	 believed	 that	








into	 being	 the	 organ	 of	 a	 school,	 and	 drove	 those	who	 did	 not	 be-
long	to	a	school	 into	either	 founding	new	journals	or	writing	major	































historical	 interest	 in	Mind	 of	 the	 1930s	 for	 something	 else.	 Colling-






12.	 See	Ryle	 (1935)	and,	 for	 the	 start	of	 the	 Joseph-Stebbing	exchange,	 Joseph	
(1932)	and	Stebbing	(1933).
13.	 See,	 e.g.,	 J.	 Wisdom’s	 (1938)	 ordinary-language	 treatment	 of	 Joseph’s	
arguments.
14.	 See	Gotshalk	(1930)	and	Oakeley	(1930).
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inference	and	clarity	in	mainstream	philosophy	m-rigour	and	m-clarity 







ing	point	 for	argumentation.	What	counts	will	 change	somewhat	 in	
response	 to	 discussion	 in	mainstream	 philosophy	 and	with	 its	 sub-
fields,	but	will	 largely	be	 constrained	at	 any	given	 time/subfield	by	
which	authors	and	discussions	are	to	be	cited	and	by	a	conservative	




in	 terms	of	 the	 requirement	 that	 an	 author’s	work	be	 relatively	 eas-
ily	understood	by	other	mainstream	philosophers,	especially	by	those	
having	 the	work	as	 their	 area	of	 specialisation.	The	 standards	of	m-
clarity	 also	 plausibly	 involve	 the	 requirement	 that	 concepts,	 propo-





























to	 resembling	 the	 standard	 picture	 of	 analytic	 philosophy	 than	 did	












to	philosophy	 and	 an	 associated	 approach	 to	 clarity.	 Let	 us	 call	 the	
admittedly	 somewhat	 heterogeneous,	 but	 nevertheless	 related	 by	
strong	resemblance,	standards	applied	over	recent	decades	in	judging	
16.	 Philosophical	dialogue	 in	 the	adversarial	mode	“consists	of	objections	and	
counterexamples	to	which	the	best	responses	are	refutations	of	objections	and	
counterexamples	followed	by more of the same”	(Friedman	2013,	p.	28,	italics	in	
the	original).










journals.	 The	 official	 function	 of	 peer	 review	 is	 certification:	 peer	
review	certifies	the	quality	of	research	output	(an	epistemic	role)	and	
of	the	scholars	producing	such	output	(a	non-epistemic	role)	(Shatz	
2004).	 Ideally,	 it	 is	merely	 in	 virtue	 of	 this	 certifying	 role	 that	 peer	
review	regulates	the	research	agenda	of	a	field.
The	 epistemic	 role	 of	 peer	 review	 is	 assessing	 the	 quality	 of	 re-
search.	 From	 the	 hundreds	 of	 thousands,	 or	 even	millions,	 of	man-
uscripts	 submitted	on	a	yearly	basis,18	 it	weeds	out	 those	which	are	
not	sound,	significant	or	novel.	Peer	review	is	thought	to	be	a	particu-
larly	powerful	 procedure	because	 it	 is	 carried	out	by	people	whose	
opinion	on	 the	 subject	 is	 authoritative;	who,	as	 scientists,	 are	more	
likely	to	judge	work	on	scientific	merit	than	in	terms	of	more	ordinary	
concerns	 (e.g.,	market	 considerations,	 politics);	 and	who	 can	 be	 as-







As	 regards	 non-epistemic	 certification,	 peer	 review	 serves	 as	 an	
evaluative	standard	in	hiring,	conferring	tenure,	promotion	and	grant	
18.	 Björk	 et  al.	 (2009;	 cited	 in	 Lee	 et  al.	 2013)	 estimate	 that	 1,346,000	 peer-
reviewed	papers	were	published	in	2006.	An	average	rejection	rate	of	50%	
would	thus	already	imply	more	than	2,000,000	submissions	for	that	year.
The	 full	 details	 of	 what	 m-rigour	 and	 m-clarity	 involve	 are	 not,	
however,	 of	 importance	 to	our	 arguments.	What	matters	 is	 that	 the	



























ments.	 For	 instance,	 among	philosophy	 journals,	 desk-rejections	by	
editors	are	still	common	practice	(Lee	and	Schunn	2011).	Further,	even	
under	 triple-blind	 review,	 editors	make	 crucial	 decisions	which	 are	
open	to	partisanship,	e.g.,	on	who	will	serve	as	a	reviewer	and	on	what	
to	do	with	reviewer	reports,	be	they	positive,	negative	or	conflicting.	




4. Epistemic and Moral Problems with Peer Review in Mainstream 
Philosophy
Our	 discussion	 thus	 far	 has	 aimed	 to	 be	 descriptive.	 The	 question	
remains	whether	peer	review	that	is	partisan	in	the	way	it	was	under	
Moore	and	Ryle,	 and,	with	all	 the	differences	acknowledged,	 in	 the	




philosophy,	 including	 its	 emphasis	 on	m-clarity	 and	m-rigour,	 over	
available	alternatives	and,	second,	that	there	are	good	epistemic	and	
moral	 reasons	 for	 avoiding	partisanship	 in	 peer	 review.	 In	 the	next	
section	we	argue	that,	given	how	easy	it	is	to	improve	current	practice,	
it	should	be	improved.
A	popular	argument	 for	scepticism	about	philosophy,	namely	 the 
argument from disagreement,	can	be	used	to	support	the	claim	that	there	
is	no	good	reason	to	prefer	the	standards	of	mainstream	philosophy	
over	 available	 alternatives.	 The	 argument	 from	 disagreement	




is	 the	 observation	 that	 philosophy	 is	 characterized	 by	 pervasive,	
persistent	 disagreement	 between	 epistemic	 peers	 about	 what	 the	
correct	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philosophical	 questions	 are.	 Given	

















Things	 get	more	 complicated	when	 it	 comes	 to	more	 recent	par-












countries.	Accordingly,	 the	community	 these	 journals	 serve	extends	
well	 beyond	 those	who	 accept	 the	 standards	 of	mainstream	 philos-
ophy;	 it	 includes,	 for	example,	many	working	 in	African	philosophy,	




widely	 adopted	 approach	 to	 philosophy.	 The	 journals	 being	 consid-
ered	are	thus,	deliberately	or	not,	partisan	about	whom	they	support	




A	more	popular	 response	 to	 the	 argument	 from	disagreement	 is	
that	 the	 appropriate	 standards	 for	 accepting	answers	 to	 substantive	
philosophical	 questions	 are	 low	 enough	 so	 as	 not	 to	 be	 rendered	
problematic	 by	 the	disagreement	we	find	 among	philosophers	 (see,	
e.g.,	 Brennan	 2010;	 Sosa	 2011;	 Goldberg	 2013;	 Siepel	 2016).	 This	
response	 acknowledges	 that	 if	 reliability	 is	 demanded	 of	 standards	
for	accepting	answers	to	substantive	philosophical	questions,	then	no	
acceptable	 standards	are	 to	be	 found.	But,	we	are	 told,	 the	 relevant	
standards	of	 acceptance	 in	philosophy	 should	not	be	 so	high.	Thus,	
for	 example,	 Sosa	writes	 that	 philosophy,	 art	 criticism,	 politics	 and	
morality	 are	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 life	 and	 that,	 accordingly,	we	need	
to	pursue	them	with	what	good	standards	we	have,	even	if	these	are	
not	those	of	science	(2011,	p.	200).	Similarly,	Goldberg	(2013,	p.	289)	




The	 just-mentioned	 proposals	 according	 to	 which	 answers	 to	
substantive	 philosophical	 questions	 need	 not	 be	 reliably	 arrived	
at	 might	 provide	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	 the	 argument	 from	
disagreement,	but	it	is	one	that	makes	partisanship	about	mainstream	































that	 appears	 to	 undermine	 similar	 claims	made	 in	 the	 present	 (see,	
e.g.,	Hacker	2009;	Brennan	2010;	Chalmers	2015).	A	further	response	
relates	 specifically	 to	 mainstream	 philosophy.	 If	 the	 claim	 that	
mainstream	philosophy	is	by	and	large	far	from	instantiating	some	set	
of	 standards	 is	 to	 block	 the	 argument	 from	disagreement,	 even	 the	
supposedly	very	best	of	mainstream	philosophy	cannot	be	supposed	

















ing	 available	 philosophical	 approaches	 to	 be	 reliable	means	 for	 set-














tablished	 grounds	 for	 taking	 available	 approaches	 to	 philosophy	 to	
suffice	reliably	to	settle	substantive	philosophical	questions?	We	base	
this	claim	on	a	reading	of	a	body	of	 literature	that	has	already	been	
extensively	 cited	 in	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 argument	 from	 disagree-
ment.	While	the	history	of	the	argument	from	disagreement	goes	back	










political,	 ethical	 and	 aesthetic	 questions	 in	 some	 context	 might	
plausibly	 be	 thought	 often	 to	 require	 a	 modicum	 of	 clarity	 and	
argumentation;	 it,	 however,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 require	 the	 peculiar	



































thesis.	Gutting	claims	 that	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 justify	philosophy’s	




obviously,	 those	 already	 cited	 as	 being	 sceptical	 about	 philosophy.	
Williamson	(2007)	goes	further	than	Gutting	and	offers	an	argument	












cent	mainstream	 literature	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 philosophical	 knowl-
edge	does	not,	as	we	have	seen,	distinguish	between	established	ap-
proaches	 to	 philosophy.	 All	 approaches	 that	 have	 been	 extensively	
tried	out	are	supposedly	equally	suspect	with	regard	to	reliability,	and	
there	 is	 supposedly	no	 agreed	epistemic	basis	 for	preferring	one	of	
these	 approaches	 over	 another.	 Some	 approaches	might	 claim	 that,	
since	they	are	relatively	new,	they	have	more	potential	for	improving	
the	 situation	 in	 philosophy	 than	do	other	 approaches;	 but	whether	
this	promise	will	be	fulfilled	remains	to	be	seen.	In	such	circumstances,	
it	would	seem	to	be	a	mistake	to	favour	any	one	approach	collectively.	
reliable.	 By	 implication,	 contemporary	 philosophy	 does	 not	 include	
such	agreement.
Gutting	 is,	 in	 comparison	 with	 most	 other	 mainstream	 philoso-
phers	who	have	recently	written	about	the	availability	of	philosophi-






suggest	 that,	according	 to	Gutting,	philosophers	are	able	 reliably	 to	
settle	some	philosophical	questions.	But	Gutting’s	two	sorts	of	philo-
sophical	knowledge	do	not	include	knowledge	of	answers	to	what	we	
have	 called	 substantive	philosophical	 questions.	Other	 relative	opti-
mists	about	philosophical	knowledge	 tend	 to	hold	 similar	positions	
(see,	e.g.,	Chalmers	2015).	Hanna	(2015)	is	perhaps	particularly	opti-
mistic	and	maintains	the	existence	of	some	philosophical	knowledge	






are	 less	optimistic	 than	Gutting.	They	emphasise	 the	extremely	 lim-
ited	existence,	or	even	nonexistence,	of	philosophical	knowledge	and	
are	 explicit	 that	 we	 do	 not	 know	 the	 answers	 to	 substantive	 philo-
sophical	questions.	These	philosophers	do	not	think	mainstream	phi-
losophy	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 reliable	 philosophical	 approach.	 Lycan	




Matheson	 (2015)	 tells	us	 that	philosophical	 investigation	 is	unlikely	
to	bring	us	closer	to	the	truth.	Sosa	(2011)	and	Brennan	(2010)	write	










approaches	 to	 philosophy;	 other	 avenues	 of	 publishing	 further	 en-

















Accordingly,	Williamson	 claims,	 it	 is	 up	 to	 critics	 of	 an	 established	




questions	 rather	 than	 for	 its	 practitioners	 to	 show	 that	 it	 is	 reliable.	
Without	something	like	the	argument	from	disagreement,	there	would	
be	no	problem	with	the	approach	of	mainstream	philosophy.
Given	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 available	 approaches,	 it	
makes	 sense	 to	 hedge	 one’s	 epistemic	 bets	 and	 to	 try	 out	 these	 ap-
proaches	as	well	as	novel	ones.
From	a	moral	 perspective,	 it	 seems	problematic	 to	prefer	papers	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 standards	 that	 have	 not	 been	 intersubjectively	 es-

























in	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 society	 in	which	 it	 occurs;	 it	might	 also	be	 tol-
erable	when	 the	partisanship	 is	 that	of	an	 institution	 that	 is	particu-
larly	important	to	the	cultural	or	religious	life	of	the	countries	where	
it	is	located	and	is	to	some	extent	compensated	for.	But	mainstream	












































if	 there	 is	a	general	presumption	 regarding	 the	 reliability	of	normal	
academic	 disciplines,	 the	 argument	 from	 disagreement	 does	 under-
mine	 this	 presumption	 in	 the	 case	 of	 mainstream	 philosophy.	 The	








mainstream	 philosophy’s	 role	 in	 education,	 including	 in	 ethics	 and	
logic	 classes,	 is	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 harm.	This	means	 that	 the	 ap-
proaches	 of	 academic	 disciplines	 cannot	 simply	 be	 presumed	 to	 be	
reliable.
The	 absence	 of	 established-to-be-reliable	 approaches	 in	 philoso-
phy,	 along	with	 the	observation	 that	 academic	philosophy	needs	 to	
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arguments	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 all	 work	 be	 judged	 equal	 with	
regard	to	its	novelty	and	significance.	Indeed,	plausibly,	novelty	and	







desideratum;	 such	work	 is	 unlikely	 to	 contribute	 anything	novel	 or	




and	 rigour	 of	 that	 practice,	 including	 of	 the	 practice’s	 requirements	
regarding	empirical	evidence.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 our	 epistemic	 and	 moral	 case	 for	 pluralism	
means	that	acknowledging	significance	as	a	constraint	on	evaluating	
philosophical	 work	 should	 not	 justify	 an	 appeal	 by	 philosophers	
to	 significance	 in	 order	 to	 set	 up	 any	 kind	 of	 new,	 highly	 selective	
criteria	for	publication	instead	of	m-clarity	and	m-rigour.	Indeed,	our	
desiderata	 call	 for	 far	more	philosophical	 freedom	 than	 is	 currently	
common	in	prominent	journals.	We,	for	example,	see	no	in-principle	
epistemic	 problem	with	 an	 approach	 to	 philosophy	 that,	 following	
Pyrrhonism,	allows	weak	arguments	a	 legitimate	place	 in	 reasoning	
(Sextus	 Empiricus,	 III	 280–281).	 So	 too,	 we	 allow	 approaches	 to	
philosophy	which,	 like	Neoplatonism	and	other	 forms	of	mysticism,	
leave	open	or	 reject	 the	possibility	 that	 philosophical	 knowledge	 is	
articulable	in	clear	or	literal	language.	Appeals	to	the	truth	of	scripture	
will	 be	 acceptable	 when	 they	 are	 part	 of	 work	 that,	 as	 a	 whole,	
contributes	to	philosophical	thought,	e.g.,	that	is	novel	and	societally	
relevant.	 And,	 since	 not	 only	 available	 approaches	 will	 count	 as	
acceptable,	there	will	be	room	for	non-academic	philosophers,	as	well	
m-clarity	 in	 peer	 review.	 If	 one	 is	 committed	 to	 the	mainstream	ap-
proach,	then	one’s	own	approach	suggests	that	the	claims	of	this	paper	
should	be	engaged	with.
5. Restructuring or Replacing Peer Review
Two	desiderata	for	adequate	review	processes	in	philosophy	journals	
are	 suggested	by	 the	previous	 section.	The	first	desideratum	 is	 that	
these	processes	should	treat	all	available	and	proposed	standards	of	
acceptance	in	philosophy	as	epistemically	equal	(irrespective	of	who	
puts	 them	 forward).	 This	 desideratum	 is	 suggested	 by	 the	 thought	
that	 pluralism	 about	 philosophical	 approaches	 makes	 sense	 given	
the	lack	of	an	established-to-be-reliable	philosophical	approach.	The	
second	 desideratum	 is	 that	 review	 of	 philosophical	 work	 should	
include	evaluating	such	work	in	light	of	the	novelty	and	significance	
of	 its	 contribution	 to	 addressing	 philosophical	 questions	 that	 we	
need	to	address	as	humans,	and	indeed,	more	broadly,	in	light	of	its	











also	 recommends	 pluralism	 in	 approaches	 to	 philosophy,	 as	 the	
historical	record	shows	that	a	wide	variety	of	philosophical	approaches,	
including	the	proposal	of	novel	approaches,	have	been	of	value.
We	 emphasise	 that,	 while	 our	 arguments	 recommend	 taking	
different	 standards	 of	 acceptance	 in	 philosophy	 to	 be	 epistemically	
equal,	 these	 arguments	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 all	 philosophical	 work	
be	 treated	 as	 being	 equal	 in	 the	 review	 process.	 In	 particular,	 our	
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the	goal	of	placing	papers	in	prominent	journals	might	still	be	strong,	























process	should	 in	 fact	be	expected	 to	 result	 in	stricter	adherence	 to	
whatever	standards	are	being	applied	in	review.	In	any	case,	given	that	
the	main	selling	point	of	m-clarity	and	m-rigour	has	been	their	truth-
conduciveness,	 and	 given	 that	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 they	 are	 truth-
conducive	 in	 the	 context	 of	 philosophy,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 reduced	
emphasis	on	these	would	be	problematic.
One	might	 also	worry	 that	 implementing	 the	 above	 suggestions	
would	 lead	to	higher	 total	publication	numbers	 in	philosophy,	 to	 in-
formation	overload	for	readers	and	to	reviewers	who	are	(even	more)	




the	 two	desiderata	 just	 outlined,	 and	 the	underlying	motivation	 for	
these	 desiderata,	 suggest	 about	 how	 peer	 review	 in	 philosophy	
journals	 should	change.	After	all,	one	might	acknowledge	 that	peer	
review	as	currently	practiced	in	mainstream	philosophy	fails	to	meet	
our	desiderata	while	 insisting	 that	doing	better	 in	 this	 regard	 is	not	
feasible.	 We	 now	 argue	 that	 this	 response	 is	 untenable	 and	 do	 so	
by	proposing,	 in	a	programmatic	manner,	ways	of	 improving	on	the	
present	situation,	including	some	that	are	relatively	easy	to	implement.
With	 regard	 to	 fostering	 pluralism	 of	 approaches	 in	 philosophy,	
the	easiest	option	 is	 for	 journals	 to	 adopt	 editorial	policies	 that	 are	









are	proposing.	 For	 such	a	 small	 sample	will	be	unlikely	 to	properly	
represent	 all	 available	 approaches.	 The	 review	 process	 itself	 faces	
similar	problems.	The	restricted	group	that	selects	reviewers	can	be	
assumed	 to	 under-represent	 existing	 diversity;	 and	 the	 same	 holds	
for	 teams	of	reviewers,	which	usually	consist	of	no	more	than	three	
individuals.
A	 further	 change	 that	 retains	 the	basic	 setup	of	 the	 current	peer	
review	system	would	be	to	lower	the	bar	for	acceptance.	Journals	could	
set	rejection	rates	at,	say,	around	60%	rather	than	at	above	90%	(as	
currently	 is	 the	case	—	see	 footnote	 1).	Lower	mainstream	standards	
of	acceptance	should	make	it	easier	for	work	to	meet	those	standards	
while	also	fulfilling	non-mainstream	standards.	At	least	initially,	when	
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no	longer	very	important.	There	are,	however,	alternative	ways	of	cer-








Plausibly,	 raising	 acceptance	 rates	 and	 changing	 editorial	 policy	
still	cannot	do	full	justice	to	the	diversity	of	existing	and	potential	ap-
proaches.	Moreover,	 plausibly,	 coming	 closer	 to	 doing	 so	would	 re-
quire	more	 inclusive	 policies	 regarding	who	 participates	 in	 peer	 re-
view,	or	even	the	elimination	of	peer	review.	A	feasible	way	of	broad-
ening	 the	participation	 in	peer	review	involves	 following	 the	public	
reviewing	 practice	 of	 most	 of	 the	 journals	 issued	 by	 the	 European	
Geoscience	Union	(EGU),	including,	e.g.,	Earth System Dynamics	and	
Climate of the Past.	Any	paper	which	passes	a	basic	quality	check	is	put	
online	 and	made	 available	 for	 public	 review	 and	 discussion.	Desig-
nated	reviewers	and	all	interested	parties	may	provide	comments,	and	
authors	get	the	opportunity	to	respond.	Based	on	the	open	discussion,	


























all,	 arise	 partly	 because	 papers	 they	 publish	would	 have	 otherwise	
been	published	elsewhere.	More	importantly,	if	philosophers	are	rea-

























































to	 journals	and	broadening	 the	group	of	people	 from	which	 review	
teams	are	drawn.	Making	the	peer	review	process	public	adds	a	further	






ily	 in	 the	hands	 of	 editors	 and	 relatively	 small	 groups	 of	 reviewers.	
And	editors	might	still	be	partisan	in	their	final	decisions,	and	papers	
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recommended	by	our	first	and	second	desiderata.	The	second	desid-
eratum	 can	 be	 further	 fulfilled	 by	 including,	 among	 the	 criteria	 for	
certification,	criteria	regarding	the	extent	to	which	philosophical	work	
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